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The last decade brought the two most significant 
developments in car technology since the invention of the car 
itself.  The first was the replacement of the gasoline engine with 
electric motors and batteries, which is steadily gaining 
acceptance with mainstream car buyers.  The second was the 
replacement of the human driver with a complex system of 
sensors and computer software in the form of the autonomous 
car.  While fully autonomous cars are not yet available for 
purchase, it is only a matter of time before they join electric 
vehicles in showrooms across the country.  Automakers and 
technology companies have poured billions of dollars into 
bringing this technology across the finish line; they test 
prototype autonomous vehicles on public roads daily, thanks in 
no small part to the efforts of federal and state regulators to 
remove legal barriers to autonomous vehicle development.  
Meanwhile, semiautonomous cars, which use much of the same 
technology to automatically steer, accelerate, brake, and park 
themselves in certain conditions, are already legion on the 
nation’s highways.  Mass-market, fully autonomous vehicles will 
almost certainly be a reality by the end of the present decade. 
The legal discussion surrounding autonomous vehicles 
currently centers on questions of how to regulate their 
deployment or apportion liability in the event of a collision, as 
well as the provocative ethical dilemma of how a self-driving car 
should decide who to kill when it can avoid hitting, for example, 
a small child or an oncoming pickup truck, but not both—the 
twenty-first century Trolley Problem.1  However, the advent of 
autonomous cars raises another question: once we have them, 
should we still be allowed to drive?  For Elon Musk, founder and 
CEO of Tesla, the car company leading the push toward mass-
market electrification and autonomy, the answer is an 
 
1  SAMUEL I. SCHWARTZ, NO ONE AT THE WHEEL: DRIVERLESS CARS AND THE 
ROAD OF THE FUTURE 167–69 (2018). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/6
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unequivocal “no.”  In 2015, Musk said it is simply “too 
dangerous” to have “a person driving a two-ton death machine.”2  
If our legislatures or federal regulatory authorities someday 
come to the same conclusion, will this country’s more than 200 
million licensed drivers3 be forced to abandon that most 
American rite of passage and let go of the wheel? 
This Comment argues that a statutory or regulatory ban on 
human driving will survive challenge under the U.S. 
Constitution.  Part II provides an overview of the state of 
autonomous vehicle development in the United States and the 
reasons why autonomous vehicles are arguably preferable to 
human drivers.  Part III establishes why, up to now, American 
courts have recognized a constitutionally protected, 
fundamental right to interstate travel, but not a fundamental 
right to drive.  Part IV explores the current legal bases for either 
a state or federal ban on human driving.  Part V predicts the 
course of events that will culminate in the human driving ban 
and addresses why judicial recognition of the right to drive is 
even more unlikely in the era of autonomous vehicles. 
 
II. We Are the Problem 
 
It was only forty years after Karl Benz invented the 
automobile in 18854 that his contemporaries began trying to 
replace the human driver with a machine.  In July of 1925, 
businessman Francis Houdina5 decided to promote his radio 
 
2  Josh Lowensohn, Elon Musk: Cars You Can Drive Will Eventually Be 
Outlawed, VERGE (Mar. 17, 2015 2:40 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/transportation/2015/3/17/8232187/elon-musk-
human-drivers-are-dangerous. 
3  Office of Highway Policy Info., Table DL-201 Licensed Drivers, By State, 
1949-2018, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. (Feb. 28, 2020), 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2018/pdf/dl201.pdf. 
4  1885–1886. The First Automobile, DAIMLER, 
https://www.daimler.com/company/tradition/company-history/1885-1886.html 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2020). 
5  Not to be confused with Harry Houdini, the famous illusionist and 
escape artist, whose mail was often delivered to Houdina by mistake.  This 
infuriated Houdini, so much so that one day he broke into Houdina’s office and 
destroyed it.  See Carl Engelking, The ‘Driverless’ Car Era Began more than 90 
Years Ago, DISCOVER (Dec. 13, 2017, 11:22 AM), 
https://www.discovermagazine.com/technology/the-driverless-car-era-began-
more-than-90-years-ago; Ryan Felton, The Man Who Tested the First 
Driverless Car in 1925 Had a Bizarre Feud with Harry Houdini, JALOPNIK 
3
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equipment company by installing remote controls in a 1926 
Chandler sedan, which he christened the “American Wonder.”6  
Houdina clung to the Chandler’s running board while his 
partner remotely operated the car from a trailing vehicle, and 
for a few terrifying moments, the American Wonder bobbed and 
weaved down the streets of New York City with no one in the 
driver’s seat “as if a phantom hand were at the wheel.”7  The 
stunt was interrupted when the steering apparatus failed and 
the Chandler crashed into the fender of a car filled with 
cameramen.8  Spectators had just witnessed the first journey—
and crash—of a “driverless” car in automotive history. 
Today, Houdina’s publicity stunt seems primitive and 
reckless, but future generations may view our current handling 
of autonomous driving technology in a similar light.  
Autonomous vehicle development in the United States is taking 
place on two, parallel paths.  In one arena, the research-and-
development arms of automakers, as well as Silicon Valley 
technology developers such as Uber and Waymo, are testing 
fully autonomous vehicles on public roads.9  In the other, 
automakers’ conventional sales-and-marketing arms are 
pushing semiautomated driving technology, such as Tesla’s 
Autopilot, on consumers in production vehicles.10  Both forms of 
testing and deploying autonomous vehicle technology have had 
deadly consequences, and both illustrate the significant 
challenges that arise when human operators are asked to share 
 
(Feb. 14, 2017, 1:27 PM), https://jalopnik.com/the-man-who-tested-the-first-
driverless-car-in-1925-had-1792312207. 
6  Engelking, supra note 5; Felton, supra note 5. 
7  Felton, supra note 5 (quoting Radio-Driven Auto Runs Down Escort, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1925, at 28). 
8  Id. 
9  See, e.g., Roberto Baldwin, Waymo Reveals Details on 5th-Gen Self-
Driving Jaguar I-Pace, CAR & DRIVER (Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a31228617/waymo-jaguar-ipace-self-
driving-details/ (“While self-driving cars are still years away, the evolution of 
the systems that are testing on public roads is of vital importance.”); Munsif 
Vengattil & Neha Malara, Uber Gets Permit to Restart Testing its Self-Driving 
Cars in California, REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2020 2:27 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-self-driving/uber-gets-permit-to-
restart-testing-its-self-driving-cars-in-california-idUSKBN1ZZ2QG.  Uber 
temporarily suspended its autonomous vehicle testing program after a fatal 
accident in March of 2018.  Id.; see infra Section II.A. 
10  See infra Section II.B. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/6
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driving responsibilities with machines.11  In large part, fatalities 
involving self-driving cars have occurred not due to the failure 
of autonomous driving technology to operate as designed, but 
rather the failure of human beings to respect and acknowledge 
that technology’s known limitations.  These incidents comprise 
a small fraction of the estimated ninety-four percent of U.S. car 
crashes caused by human error.12  It is for this reason that when 
autonomous driving is viable on a mass scale, legislators and 
federal regulators may see fit to eliminate human drivers from 
public roads in the interest of public safety. 
 
A. Death of Elaine Herzberg 
 
The first known fatality involving a prototype autonomous 
vehicle occurred on March 18, 2018, in the Phoenix suburb of 
Tempe, Arizona.13  A 2017 Volvo XC90 sport-utility vehicle, 
modified and operated by Uber’s autonomous vehicle division, 
struck and killed a pedestrian, Elaine Herzberg, at 
approximately forty miles per hour as she was walking her 
bicycle across the road at night.14  The National Transportation 
Safety Board (“NTSB”), which investigated the crash, 
determined that the Volvo struck Herzberg because Uber’s test 
operator, Rafaela Vasquez, was distracted by her smartphone 
and not watching the road.15 
 
11  See infra Sections II.A, II.B. 
12  U.S. DEP’T OF TRANS. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 
812 115, CRITICAL REASONS FOR CRASHES INVESTIGATED IN THE NATIONAL MOTOR 
VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION SURVEY 1 (2015), 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812115; Self-
Driving Coalition Statement on NHTSA’s 2017 Fatal Traffic Crash Report, 
SELF-DRIVING COALITION FOR SAFER STREETS (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.selfdrivingcoalition.org/newsroom/press-releases/self-driving-
coalition-statement-on-nhtsas-2017-fatal-traffic-crash-report [hereinafter 
Self-Driving Coalition Statement]. 
13  See generally NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/HAR-19/03, PB2019-
101402, COLLISION BETWEEN VEHICLE CONTROLLED BY DEVELOPMENTAL 
AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEM AND PEDESTRIAN, TEMPE, ARIZONA, MARCH 18, 
2018 (2019) [hereinafter UBER NTSB FINAL REPORT], 
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/HAR1903.pdf. 
14  Id. at v. 
15  Id. (“[T]he probable cause of the crash in Tempe, Arizona, was the 
failure of the vehicle operator to monitor the driving environment and the 
operation of the automated driving system because she was visually distracted 
throughout the trip by her personal cell phone.”). 
5
2020 BIRTH OF AUTONOMOUS DRIVING 293 
To reduce the potential for false alarms, Uber had 
programmed its automated driving system so that it would not 
perform sudden, emergency stops; if an emergency required 
hard braking beyond a certain threshold, the test operator had 
to intervene.16  Vasquez had been trained on the system’s 
operation.17  On the night of the crash, the system detected 
Herzberg walking into the road nearly six seconds before impact; 
when the system determined a collision was imminent, it did not 
activate the brakes because heavy braking was required to avoid 
hitting her.18  Meanwhile, Vasquez was watching The Voice on 
Hulu,19 so she noticed Herzberg only one second before impact 
and did not react in time.20  Police estimated that had Vasquez 
been watching the road, she could have stopped the Volvo with 
more than two car lengths to spare.21 
After conducting their own investigation, local authorities 
determined Uber was not criminally liable in the crash, but left 
open the possibility that Vasquez would be charged 
 
16  Id. at 13–14.  “An emergency was defined as a situation requiring 
braking at a deceleration greater than 7 meters per second squared (m/s2) (0.71 
g) or rate of deceleration (jerk) greater than ±5 meters per second cubed (m/s3) 
to prevent a collision.”  Id. at 13.  Put simply, the system was allowed to brake 
automatically with up to 0.71 g of force.  Id.  If the system detected a hazard 
that required braking beyond that limit, it gave the operator one second to 
respond.  Id. at 13–14.  If, after one second, the operator did not respond, the 
system would brake automatically only if it could avoid a collision by applying 
up to 0.71 g of braking force.  Id. at 14.  Where more than 0.71 g of braking 
force was required to avoid a collision, the system would begin a “gradual 
vehicle slowdown” but would not brake up to the limit, even though doing so 
would mitigate the force of the impact.  Id.  For this reason, “[t]he primary 
countermeasure in an emergency situation was the vehicle operator, who was 
expected to recognize the hazard, to take control of the vehicle, and to intervene 
appropriately.”  Id. 
17  Id. at 28–29. 
18  Id. at 40. 
19  Associated Press, Uber Autonomous-SUV Driver Streamed ‘The Voice’ 
Just before Deadly Arizona Crash, Report Says, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 2018 
11:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-uber-self-driving-
death-20180622-story.html.  A local police report, and not the NTSB report, 
specified the television program and streaming service.  Id. 
20  UBER NTSB FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 1–2. 
21  See Associated Press, supra note 19 (“[O]fficers calculated that had 
Vasquez been paying attention, she could have reacted 143 feet before impact 
and brought the SUV to a stop about 42.6 feet before hitting Herzberg.”); Used 
2017 Volvo XC90 SUV Features & Specs, EDMUNDS, 
https://www.edmunds.com/volvo/xc90/2017/suv/features-specs/ (last visited 
Apr. 29, 2020) (stating that the 2017 Volvo XC90 has a length of 194.9 inches, 
which is approximately 16.2 feet). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/6
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individually22; at the time of writing, no such charges have been 
reported.23  Whether Vasquez should bear full responsibility for 
the crash is up for some debate.  For example, the NTSB 
concluded in its final report that Uber should have programmed 
its automated driving system to brake automatically in 
emergencies even when braking would only mitigate (and not 
prevent) a collision.24  The report also revealed that Herzberg 
had methamphetamine in her system at the time of the crash, 
which may have led her to cross the road when it was unsafe to 
do so.25  What seems beyond debate is that had Vasquez been 
watching the road as required, “she would likely have had 
sufficient time to detect and react to the crossing pedestrian to 
avoid the crash or mitigate the impact.”26 
 
B. Deaths Involving Tesla Autopilot 
 
Thankfully, but no less tragically, Herzberg’s death remains the 
only reported fatality involving a prototype autonomous vehicle 
in the United States.  However, a mounting number of deaths 
attributed to Tesla’s semiautomated driving system, Autopilot, 
have captured national headlines and drawn the ire of the 
NTSB.27  Autopilot is a suite of “driver assistance” features (to 
 
22  Uriel J. Garcia, No Criminal Charges for Uber in Tempe Death; Police 




23  As part of its ongoing investigation, the Tempe Police Department had 
a technical expert conduct a lighting study at the crash site in July of 2019.  
Ray Stern, Exclusive: Road Lighting Was Ideal at Site of Fatal Uber Self-
Driving Crash, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (Nov. 21, 2019 10:05 AM), 
https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/uber-self-driving-tempe-crash-
lighting-video-driver-rafaela-vasquez-11394567.  The expert’s report, which 
refers to the project as “State of Arizona v Rafaela Vasquez,” concludes that 
the street lamp illumination was so bright on the night of the crash that “had 
she been paying attention, Ms. Vasquez could have seen Ms. Herzberg starting 
across the road when the car was a little over 800 feet from the point of impact.”  
James S. Sobek, Summary of Analysis, WOLF TECH. SERVS., INC. 1, 2 (2019), 
https://images.phoenixnewtimes.com/media/pdf/wolf_lighting_report.pdf. 
24  UBER NTSB FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 40. 
25  Id. at 36. 
26  Id. at 43. 
27  See, e.g., Tom Krisher, 3 Crashes, 3 Deaths Raise Questions about 
Tesla’s Autopilot, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 3, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/ca5e62255bb87bf1b151f9bf075aaadf (“In addition to the 
7
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use industry parlance) that allow Tesla models to perform some 
driving tasks under the right conditions.28  A combination of 
radar sensors, ultrasonic sensors, and cameras monitor the 
vehicle’s driving environment and allow it to stay centered in its 
lane, keep a safe distance from vehicles ahead, and even execute 
lane changes with minimal input from the driver.29  Tesla is not 
alone in offering this technology to consumers; competing 
systems from luxury brands such as Cadillac, Infiniti, and Volvo 
perform similar functions.30  Tesla is also not the first to conceive 
of these features; adaptive cruise control, lane-keeping aids, and 
automatic emergency braking systems predate Autopilot by 
many years and rely on the same technology.31  What Tesla has 
done with Autopilot is integrate these features in a cohesive, 
sexy-sounding package that aims to give Tesla customers a taste 
of the future, in line with Elon Musk’s well-cultivated “Real-Life 
Tony Stark” image.32 
That taste of the future has turned into a lethal overdose.  
Since Tesla introduced Autopilot, several people have died 
because they used the system as though it were capable of fully 
autonomous driving, which it is not.  Autopilot and competing 
 
deaths on Sunday night, three U.S. fatal crashes since 2016—two in Florida 
and one in Silicon Valley—involved vehicles using Autopilot.”); Brad 
Templeton, NTSB Report on Tesla Autopilot Fatality Comes Down Hard on 




28  Autopilot and Full Self-Driving Capability, TESLA, 
https://www.tesla.com/support/autopilot (last visited Apr. 29, 2020). 
29  Id.; see also TESLA, MODEL 3 OWNER’S MANUAL 84 (2020.4 N. Am. ed. 
2020). 
30  See, e.g., Patrick Olsen, Cadillac Tops Tesla in Consumer Reports’ First 
Ranking of Automated Driving Systems, CONSUMER REPORTS (Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://www.consumerreports.org/autonomous-driving/cadillac-tops-tesla-in-
automated-systems-ranking/ (ranking semiautomated driving systems from 
Cadillac, Infiniti, Tesla, and Volvo). 
31  See Automated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY 
ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/automated-vehicles-
safety (last visited Apr. 29, 2020). 
32  See, e.g., Connor Simpson, Everyone Wants Elon Musk to Be Tony 
Stark, ATLANTIC (Aug. 24, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/08/everyone-wants-elon-
musk-be-real-life-tony-stark/311814/ (positing that Musk and the fictitious 
Iron Man character, Tony Stark, have become “so intertwined Musk may start 
drawing cease-and-desist letters from Marvel”). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/6
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“Level 2”33 systems lack the more sophisticated hardware and 
software required to provide the same level of driving autonomy 
as prototype vehicles such as Uber’s fleet of Volvo XC90s.34  
Level 2 vehicles demand the driver’s continued attention to the 
road because their sensors are not designed to be infallible, even 
though they may work with convincing accuracy in the right 
conditions.35  The first known fatal incident involving Autopilot 
occurred in 2016 when a Tesla Model S sedan crashed into a 
tractor trailer at more than seventy miles per hour near 
Williston, Florida, killing the Tesla’s driver.36  The NTSB 
investigated the crash and concluded that the driver, Joshua 
Brown, had been using Autopilot and was not steering for the 
majority of the forty-one minute trip; the system had warned 
 
33  SAE International, a global standards-setting organization, ranks 
levels of driving autonomy on a six-tier scale, ranging from No Automation 
(Level 0) to Full Automation (Level 5).  Automated Vehicles for Safety, supra 
note 31.  A Level 2 system, classified as Partial Automation, “can actually 
control both steering and braking/accelerating simultaneously under some 
circumstances.  The human driver must continue to pay full attention (‘monitor 
the driving environment’) at all times and perform the rest of the driving task.”  
Id. 
34  See, e.g., Jack Stewart, Why Tesla’s Autopilot Can’t See a Stopped 
Firetruck, WIRED (Aug. 27, 2018 3:27 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/tesla-
autopilot-why-crash-radar/.  A key component of today’s autonomous 
prototypes is lidar, which “use[s] lasers to build a precise, detailed map of the 
world around the car, and can easily distinguish between a hub cap and a cop 
car. . . . Just about everybody working on a fully self-driving system—the kind 
that doesn’t depend on lazy, inattentive humans for support—plans to use 
lidar, along with radar and cameras.”  Id. 
35  See id. 
36  See generally NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/HAR-17/02, PB2017-
102600, COLLISION BETWEEN A CAR OPERATING WITH AUTOMATED VEHICLE 
CONTROL SYSTEMS AND A TRACTOR-SEMITRAILER TRUCK NEAR WILLISTON, 
FLORIDA, MAY 7, 2016 (2017) [hereinafter FLORIDA NTSB FINAL REPORT], 
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/HAR1702.pdf. 
The Tesla was traveling in the eastbound lanes of a four-lane highway when 
the tractor trailer, travelling westbound, made a left-hand turn across the 
Tesla’s path onto a local road.  Id. at vi.  The Tesla struck the tractor trailer 
perpendicularly and sheared off its roof as it passed underneath the 
semitrailer, id., which suggests the driver suffered fatal head trauma as often 
occurs in this type of “side underride” crash.  See, e.g., Ronan Farrow et al., 
Side Underride Crashes Kill 200 People a Year. Will Congress Act?, NBC NEWS 
(Feb. 17, 2017 11:40 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/side-
underride-crashes-kill-200-people-year-will-congress-act-n711721 (“It’s one of 
the most devastating traffic accidents: A car slams into the side of a tractor-
trailer and crashes underneath, where many of its safety features are rendered 
worthless.  The top of the vehicle may be sheared off; in many cases, the 
occupants are decapitated.”). 
9
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him to hold the steering wheel seven times prior to impact.37  
Meanwhile, the Tesla’s automatic emergency braking system 
“was not designed to, and did not, identify the truck crossing the 
car’s path or recognize the impending crash”38; in a written 
statement, Tesla posited that the vehicle’s camera system was 
unable to distinguish the white semitrailer from the bright 
daytime sky behind it.39  Following the crash, Tesla revised 
Autopilot and transmitted a wireless update to Autopilot-
equipped vehicles to reduce the amount of time the system would 
allow the driver to keep his hands off the wheel before issuing 
an alert.40 
Of the additional Autopilot fatalities that have occurred in 
the intervening years, none has garnered more media attention 
than the death of Apple engineer Wei “Walter” Huang,41 who 
died in March of 2018 after his Tesla Model X sport-utility 
veered into a concrete highway divider at more than seventy 
miles per hour.42  An NTSB investigation determined that 
Autopilot steered the car into a “gore,” or a triangular section of 
pavement, that separated the main lanes from a left-side exit 
ramp.43  Data from Huang’s iPhone and the Tesla revealed he 
was playing a game on his phone and not steering the car in the 
seconds before the crash.44  The Tesla headed toward a concrete 
divider, which the vehicle’s collision avoidance system was not 
designed to detect; as a result, the Tesla actually accelerated to 
maintain its set cruising speed and plowed straight into the 
 
37  FLORIDA NTSB FINAL REPORT, supra note 36, at 14. 
38  Id. at 30. 
39  See The Tesla Team, A Tragic Loss, TESLA (June 30, 2016), 
https://www.tesla.com/blog/tragic-loss (“Neither Autopilot nor the driver 
noticed the white side of the tractor trailer against a brightly lit sky, so the 
brake was not applied.”). 
40  FLORIDA NTSB FINAL REPORT, supra note 36, at 16. 
41  See, e.g., Neal E. Boudette, Fatal Tesla Crash Raises New Questions 
about Autopilot System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/business/tesla-crash-autopilot-
musk.html. 
42  NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/HAR-20/01, PB2020-100112, 
COLLISION BETWEEN A SPORT UTILITY VEHICLE OPERATING WITH PARTIAL 
DRIVING AUTOMATION AND A CRASH ATTENUATOR, MOUNTAIN VIEW, CALIFORNIA, 
MARCH 23, 2018, at ix (2020) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA NTSB FINAL REPORT], 
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/HAR2001.pdf. 
43  Id. 
44  Id. at ix, 19–20. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/6
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divider.45  The NTSB report declared the probable cause of the 
crash was “the Tesla Autopilot system steering the sport utility 
vehicle into a highway gore area due to system limitations, and 
the driver’s lack of response due to distraction likely from a cell 
phone game application and overreliance on the Autopilot 
partial driving automation system.”46  The report also noted that 
Autopilot’s “ineffective monitoring of driver engagement . . . 
facilitated the driver’s complacency and inattentiveness.”47 
NTSB Chairman Robert Sumwalt offered more pointed 
criticism against the backdrop of that forensic analysis.  “It’s 
time to stop enabling drivers in any partially automated vehicle 
to pretend that they have driverless cars.  Because they don’t 
have driverless cars,” he said of manufacturers and federal 
regulators.48  His message to drivers: “If you own a car with 
partial automation, you do not own a self-driving car.  Don’t 
pretend that you do.”49 
 
C. Automated Driving Systems as a Scapegoat for Human 
Failures 
 
Negative media coverage of crashes like the ones that killed 
Elaine Herzberg and Walter Huang creates the impression that 
autonomous driving technology cannot be trusted.50  A more 
careful reading of those stories reveals that it is our trust in 
human beings, and not the technology, that is misplaced.  One 
reason is that humans are prone to what the NTSB calls 
“automation complacency.”51  Simply put, when an autonomous 
 
45  Id. at x. 
46  Id. at ix. 
47  Id. 
48  David Shepardson, Tesla and U.S. Regulators Strongly Criticized over 
Role of Autopilot in Crash, REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2020 1:19 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tesla-crash/tesla-and-us-regulators-
strongly-criticized-over-role-of-autopilot-in-crash-idUSKBN20J2B8. 
49  Michael Laris, Fatal Tesla Crash Tied to Technology and Driver 




50  See, e.g., Boudette, supra note 41 (noting, however, that “on the 
question of whether any flaws in [Autopilot] had led to the crash, the NTSB 
had “found no such flaws”). 
51  UBER NTSB FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 43–44 (citing LAWRENCE 
11
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vehicle performs without failure, humans tend to rely on the 
automated system and become less attentive to the road.52  As a 
result, we are not able to react in time when the system suddenly 
requires our intervention.53  The Tempe crash is a textbook case, 
where Rafaela Vasquez grew so confident in the Uber system 
that she turned her gaze to her smartphone and did not see 
Herzberg in time to prevent the collision.54  That does not excuse 
Vasquez’s conduct, but it illustrates the danger of apportioning 
driving responsibilities between human and machine. 
A second reason is that human beings do not follow 
instructions.  The owner’s manuals of vehicles with 
semiautomated driving systems contain clear disclaimers that 
the technology is not a substitute for the driver’s full attention 
to the road.55  Nonetheless, many drivers push the technology to 
its limits and let their cars “drive themselves”—sometimes due 
to drowsiness, other times for attention on social media, but 
never with due respect for the vehicles’ limitations.56  Aware of 
 
J. PRINZEL III, NASA, THE RELATIONSHIP OF SELF-EFFICACY AND COMPLACENCY 
IN PILOT-AUTOMATION INTERACTION iii (2002)); see also PRINZEL, supra, at 2 
(“[Automation complacency] is exhibited as a false sense of security, which the 
operator develops while working with highly reliable automation; however, no 
machine is perfect and can fail without warning.”). 
52  UBER NTSB FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 43–44. 
53  See id. at 44. 
54  Id. 
55  See, e.g., TESLA, supra note 29, at 85 (“Never depend on [Autopilot’s] 
components to keep you safe.  It is the driver’s responsibility to stay alert, drive 
safely, and be in control of the vehicle at all times.”); INFINITI, QX50 2020 
OWNER’S MANUAL AND MAINTENANCE INFORMATION 5-101 (2019) (warning 
reader that ProPILOT Assist semiautomated driving system “is not a self-
driving system” and “is not designed to correct careless, inattentive, or absent-
minded driving,” and that it remains “the driver’s responsibility to stay alert, 
drive safely, keep the vehicle in the traveling lane, and be in control of the 
vehicle at all times”). 
56  E.g., Nelson Ireson, This Moron Left the Driver’s Seat in a Self-Driving 
Infiniti Q50 on the Highway: Video, MOTOR AUTHORITY (Aug. 6, 2014), 
https://www.motorauthority.com/news/1093723_this-moron-left-the-drivers-
seat-in-a-self-driving-infiniti-q50-on-the-highway-video; Alex Nunez, Dumb 
Infiniti Owner Climbs into Passenger Seat, Lets Car Drive Itself, ROAD & TRACK 
(Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.roadandtrack.com/car-
culture/videos/a8497/video-infiniti-q50-driver-climbs-into-passenger-seat-for-
self-driving-demo/; Alexander Stoklosa, Tesla Driver Recorded Asleep, Not-
Driving Driving down California’s 405 Freeway, CAR & DRIVER (June 17, 2019), 
https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a28066700/tesla-driver-asleep-at-wheel/ 
(noting that other videos showed Tesla drivers “climbing out of the driver’s seat 
and into the passenger or rear seats while the car seemingly drove itself”).  
Commendably, journalists derided these thrill seekers and cautioned readers 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/6
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our tendency to break the rules, automakers design 
semiautomated systems to detect driver disengagement and 
eventually shut down if the driver does not respond to audible 
and visual warnings.57  These safeguards are not infallible, and 
they are built with a delay so that the driver does not have to 
constantly tug at the steering wheel to signal that he is alert.58  
While the NTSB and others argue these “nanny” functions 
should be programmed more aggressively, ultimately there is 
only so much automakers can do to save drivers from themselves 
if they are not willing to use semiautomated driving systems as 
intended. 
That is not to say the automakers are blameless.  A third 
human factor in autonomous vehicle crashes, specifically those 
involving Teslas, is the braggadocio of the people who market 
them.  For one thing, the name “Autopilot” is problematic 
because it suggests the driver can simply “set it and forget it” as 
though he were flying a private jet.59  Elon Musk is known to 
make bold claims about the self-driving capabilities of his 
product.60  And despite a raft of bad publicity linking Autopilot 
to the death of Tesla customers, the company’s website still 
proclaims, without a visible disclaimer, that “Autopilot enables 
your car to steer, accelerate and brake automatically within its 
lane.  Full Self-Driving Capability introduces additional 
features and improves existing functionality to make your car 
more capable over time . . . .”61  Statements like these create 
 
against performing similar stunts even before Autopilot fatalities brought the 
danger of misusing semiautomated driving systems into the national spotlight. 
57  E.g., CALIFORNIA NTSB FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 15.  Most 
systems rely on torque sensors in the steering wheel to detect if the driver is 
steering the car.  See id. 
58  See id. 
59  See Senator Markey Announces Recommended Safety Fixes for Tesla 
Autopilot, ED MARKEY (Jan. 24, 2020), 
https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-markey-
announces-recommended-safety-fixes-for-tesla-autopilot (“Tesla promotes 
confusion about the capabilities and limits of its driver assistance system with 
an inherently misleading name—’Autopilot’—that encourages users to over-
rely on the technology.”). 
60  See, e.g., Boudette, supra note 41 (“Autopilot does not use lidar—a kind 
of radar based on lasers—that Waymo and others have maintained are crucial 
for fully autonomous vehicles. Mr. Musk has said he believes lidar is not 
necessary for Autopilot to be safe.”). 
61  Features, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/model3 (last visited Apr. 30, 
2020). 
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tension with the carefully crafted language in Tesla owner’s 
manuals that spells out Autopilot’s real-world limitations.62  If 
these claims embolden Tesla customers to use Autopilot in ways 
for which it was not designed, blame rightly falls on Tesla and 
not the driver.  But misleading marketing does not amount to a 
defect in the technology.  Autopilot represents a case of 
functional technology, engineered with known limitations, 
placed in the hands of human beings who misuse it at their peril. 
 
D. Eliminating Human Drivers as a Long-Term Solution 
 
The irony of crashes involving driver assistance technology 
like Autopilot is that they illustrate just how badly drivers need 
assistance.  On the whole, human beings are far less reliable 
drivers than their computerized counterparts.  First, even 
outside the context of automation complacency, humans are 
prone to distraction.  Thousands of people die annually in the 
United States in distracted-driving crashes, many of which are 
linked to cell phone use.63  Second, humans are creatures of 
emotion.  Those emotions can manifest as derelict driving 
behavior, such as speeding, weaving between lanes, refusal to 
yield the right of way, and other forms of road rage.  Third, 
humans drive irresponsibly.  In 2018, more than 10,500 people 
died in crashes involving a drunken driver64; another 775 road 
fatalities were attributed to driver drowsiness.65  Finally, it 
takes time for humans to learn to drive well.  New drivers may 
lack the judgment, cautiousness, and driving skill of more 
seasoned motorists, but they use the same roads as other drivers 
despite their inexperience.  In that light, it comes as little 
surprise that drivers aged sixteen to nineteen are nearly three 
times more likely than those aged twenty or older to be in a fatal 
 
62  See TESLA, supra note 29, at 85. 
63  U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 
812 700, DISTRACTED DRIVING IN FATAL CRASHES, 2017, at 1 (2019), 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812700 
(recording 2935 fatal crashes on U.S. roadways in 2017 that involved 
distraction, of which 14% involved cell phone use). 
64  U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 
812 826, 2018 FATAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES: OVERVIEW 6 (2019), 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812826. 
65  Id. at 8. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/6
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crash.66 
All of the foregoing bodes in favor of widespread adoption of 
autonomous vehicles.  Because self-driving cars eliminate most 
of our human shortcomings, driving safety experts predict 
driving deaths will drop dramatically in the United States once 
production autonomous vehicles take to the roadways.67  
Concededly, technology developers and car manufacturers have 
a few obstacles to overcome before we reach that point.  Reducing 
the cost of self-driving equipment,68 preventing inclement 
weather from interfering with vehicle sensors,69 and persuading 
consumers that they can entrust their lives to a computer70 are 
three current challenges that may delay the mass deployment of 
autonomous cars.  But the push toward vehicle autonomy, much 
like vehicle electrification, has developed a momentum of its 
own.  That momentum, coupled with the significant lifesaving 
benefits that autonomous vehicle technology has to offer, means 





66  Teen Drivers: Get the Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (Oct. 30, 2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/teen_drivers/teendrivers_factsheet.ht
ml. 
67  E.g., Chris Isidore, Self-Driving Cars Are Already Really Safe, CNN 
BUSINESS (Mar. 21, 2018 12:07 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/21/technology/self-driving-car-safety/ (quoting 
driving safety experts on reasons automated driving systems are safer and 
more capable than human drivers); accord Self-Driving Coalition Statement, 
supra note 12 (“By removing humans from the driving process entirely, fully 
self-driving vehicles offer an opportunity to significantly reduce the number of 
crash fatalities and injuries.” (quoting Self-Driving Coal. Gen. Counsel and 
Former NHTSA Adm’r David Strickland)). 
68  Alex Davies, This Lidar Is So Cheap It Could Make Self-Driving a 
Reality, WIRED (July 11, 2019 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/lidar-
cheap-make-self-driving-reality/ (citing $75,000-per-unit cost of current lidar 
equipment and quoting Elon Musk as saying “[a]nyone relying on lidar is 
doomed” because it is so expensive). 
69  Will Knight, Snow and Ice Pose a Vexing Obstacle for Self-Driving Cars, 
WIRED (Feb. 3, 2020 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/snow-ice-pose-
vexing-obstacle-self-driving-cars/. 
70  See Paul Lienert & Maria Caspani, Americans Still Don’t Trust Self-
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E. Challenges of Autonomous and Human-Driven Vehicles 
Using Common Infrastructure 
 
Comingling autonomous vehicles with human-driven cars 
on public roads does not pose a problem in the near term.  That 
is because autonomous vehicles, as they are designed today, 
operate reactively like a human driver: they interpret signals 
from the surrounding environment to make driving decisions.  
For example, when a human driver observes the brake lights of 
a leading vehicle, he interprets those lights as a signal that the 
vehicle is braking and will slow down, and applies his own 
brakes to avoid a rear-end collision.  An autonomous vehicle goes 
through a similar process, substituting external sensors and 
computer software for the human’s eyes and brain, respectively.  
It particularly benefits from an invisible sixth sense, radar, 
which can detect other vehicles’ changes in speed and direction 
without relying on visual cues.71  In theory, autonomous cars and 
human-driven cars could cohabitate the roadways forever by 
reacting to each other, pedestrians, and various other stimuli in 
the driving environment just as we do today. 
The problem is that this reactive driving model does not 
unlock autonomous vehicles’ full potential.  Vehicle-to-vehicle 
(“V2V”) communication, as well as vehicle-to-infrastructure 
(“V2I”) communication, represents the next logical step in 
autonomous driving development.  Simply put, this technology 
allows vehicles to communicate wirelessly with one another or 
the road infrastructure around them.72  V2V communication is 
already available on a range of Mercedes-Benz models, albeit in 
a very limited capacity—Mercedes can only communicate with 
fellow Mercedes.73  Likewise, Audi offers a form of V2I 
communication that collects data from traffic lights to alert the 
driver when the signal is about to change from red to green; the 
 
71  See generally Katie Burke, How Does a Self-Driving Car See?, NVIDIA 
(Apr. 15, 2019), https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/2019/04/15/how-does-a-self-
driving-car-see/.  Nvidia is a major U.S. developer of autonomous driving 
technology. 
72  SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 176–77. 
73 See Mercedes Me Connect, MERCEDES-BENZ, 
https://www.mbusa.com/en/mercedes-me-connect (last visited May 2, 2020) 
(“With Car-to-X Communication, information is exchanged between vehicles 
on the road, alerting you to various hazards up ahead, such as an accident, fog 
or icy conditions.”). 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/6
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system can even recommend speed adjustments that will ensure 
the vehicle passes through upcoming intersections during green 
light intervals.74  Today, these applications of the technology are 
more luxury car gimmickry than a serious element of the driving 
ecosystem; however, they have serious potential to promote the 
safe, efficient flow of traffic, because they will allow autonomous 
vehicles to operate proactively rather than reactively.  For 
example, highway lane merges will be more organized because 
self-driving cars will be able to “negotiate” and synchronize their 
positions ahead of time, and the vehicles will be able to safely 
travel closer together at higher speeds because their movements 
will be entirely predictable to one another.75 
The only wrench in the system, then, would be the human-
driven car that does not play by the rules.  One of the difficulties 
that autonomous prototype test drivers have encountered is the 
belligerent conduct of other drivers.  Autonomous prototypes are 
generally programmed to drive conservatively in the interest of 
safety.76  That means adhering to speed limits and maintaining 
a safe following distance from the vehicle ahead—practices 
foreign to probably the majority of drivers in any U.S. 
metropolitan area.  Other drivers tend to become impatient and 
take advantage of self-driving prototypes in high-tension traffic 
situations that require assertiveness to keep moving,77 such as 
four-way stops or toll both merges.  As a result, developers have 
either had to take the wheel temporarily so that the passive 
prototype does not become a sitting duck, or program the car to 
be more assertive, more humanlike, and less strictly law-
 
74  Audi Expands Traffic Light Information - Now Includes Speed 
Recommendations to Minimize Stops, AUDI NEWSROOM, 
https://media.audiusa.com/en-us/releases/301 (last visited May 2, 2020). 
75  See generally LIN LI ET AL., SAE INT’L, SWARM INTELLIGENCE BASED 
ALGORITHM FOR MANAGEMENT OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES ON ARTERIALS (2018).  
In addition, “we may be able to prevent wrong-way driving entirely, along with 
a host of other car-related incidents that lead to personal injuries and property 
destruction.  A V2I could tell the car it is going the wrong way and compel the 
car to stop.”  SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 177; accord, FLORIDA NTSB FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 36, at 38–40 (discussing research on V2V technology’s 
potential to prevent crashes). 
76  Jeremy Hsu, Volvo Fears Human Drivers Will Bully Driverless Cars, 
DISCOVER (Nov. 2, 2016 7:44 PM), http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/lovesick-
cyborg/2016/11/02/volvo-fears-human-drivers-will-bully-driverless-
cars/#.XKgd35hKg2w. 
77  Id. 
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abiding.78  It is not difficult to imagine how the problem might 
be exacerbated when, instead of one self-driving car traveling 
among a bunch of human-driven cars, one or two aggressive 
human drivers infiltrate a group of coordinated autonomous 
vehicles that are not able to communicate with the interlopers.  
The autonomous vehicles could try to maneuver around them, 
but where self-driving cars become the predominant form of 
transportation, the problem might be remedied just as easily 
through government action to eliminate human driving. 
 
III. We Have No Fundamental Right to Drive 
 
The specter of a driving ban raises an important question: 
can the states or the federal government eliminate our ability to 
drive within the bounds of the U.S. Constitution?  To answer 
that question, we first must establish whether physically driving 
a car is a fundamental personal freedom.  If it is, any 
government effort to curtail that freedom would be subject to 
strict scrutiny: the driving ban would have to be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest in the eyes of the 
reviewing court.79  If driving a car is not a fundamental freedom, 
the human driving ban would be subject to the far less rigorous 
rational basis test; in other words, it would have to be rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest.80 
 
78  Claire Groden, Why Google Wants its Self-Driving Cars to Be More Like 
You, FORTUNE (Sept. 29, 2015 8:57 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/09/29/google-
self-driving-cars-humans/. 
79  E.g., Zizi v. Bausman, 306 F. Supp. 3d 697, 705 (E.D. Pa. 2018) 
(“Restrictions on fundamental rights must pass strict scrutiny and be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”).  See generally Roy G. 
Spece, Jr. & David Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285 
(2015). 
80  E.g., Winston v. City of Syracuse, 887 F.3d 553, 566 (2d Cir. 2018) (“To 
establish a substantive due process violation, a plaintiff must show . . . that 
the statute, ordinance, or regulation in question is not rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.”); Bausman, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 705 (“Where 
the claimed right is not fundamental, the governmental regulation need only 
be reasonably related to a legitimate state objective.”); see also M’Culloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 317 (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the [C]onstitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the 
letter and spirit of the [C]onstitution, are constitutional.”).  See generally 
Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV. 
1627 (2016). 
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The first eight amendments to the U.S. Constitution grant 
every person in the United States certain well-known, well-
defined fundamental rights.  Some of these include freedom of 
speech, religion, and the press81; the right to bear arms82; the 
right against unreasonable searches and seizures83; the right not 
to testify against oneself in a criminal proceeding84; the right to 
the assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding85; the right to 
a jury trial86; and the right against cruel and unusual 
punishment.87  The Supreme Court has recognized other 
fundamental rights not expressly granted in the Constitution.88  
These include the rights to marry, to have children, to direct the 
education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital privacy, 
to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion, which 
are conferred via the Due Process Clauses’ guarantees of 
“liberty.”89  Driving a car is conspicuously absent from that list.  
However, the Court has also provided that Americans have a 
fundamental right “to travel from one state to another, and 
necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce in doing so . . . .”90 
 
A. The Fundamental Right to Interstate Travel 
 
The Supreme Court’s decisions on the right to interstate 
travel reflect a longstanding judicial debate over where that 
 
81  U.S. CONST. amend I. 
82  Id. amend. II. 
83  Id. amend. IV. 
84  Id. amend. V. 
85  Id. amend. VI. 
86  Id. amends. VI, VII. 
87  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
88  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
89  Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
90  United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).  The Court’s more 
recent decision in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), specified that the right to 
travel 
protects [1] the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to 
leave another State, [2] the right to be treated as a welcome 
visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily 
present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect 
to become permanent residents, [3] the right to be treated 
like other citizens of that State. 
Id. at 500. 
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right resides within the U.S. Constitution.91  The debate 
originated with Crandall v. Nevada,92 in which the Court 
considered the validity of a one-dollar Nevada tax on all persons 
leaving the state by railroad, stage coach, or another mode of for-
hire transportation.93  Invoking language from then-Chief 
Justice Taney’s dissenting opinion in The Passenger Cases,94 the 
Court struck down the tax as infringing on U.S. citizens’ right to 
travel freely from state to state: “We are all citizens of the United 
States, and as members of the same community must have the 
right to pass and repass through every part of it without 
interruption, as freely as in our own States.”95  The Court based 
its holding on a series of cases from the Court’s early history (the 
most famous of which being M’Culloch v. Maryland96) that 
invalidated state taxes that were seen to encroach on federal 
power: 
 
In all these cases the opponents of the taxes 
levied by the States were able to place their 
opposition on no express provision of the 
Constitution, except in that of Brown v. 
Maryland.  But in all the other cases, and in that 
case also, the court distinctly placed the invalidity 
of the State taxes on the ground that they 
interfered with an authority of the Federal 
government, which was itself only to be sustained 
as necessary and proper to the exercise of some 
other power expressly granted.97 
 
By the Court’s reasoning, the federal government’s right to 
exercise its constitutional powers without interference from the 
states meant that U.S. citizens—whom the government existed 
to serve and upon whose service it might call in performance of 
its duties—possessed a “correlative” right to travel freely 
throughout the country so that they could engage with that 
 
91  See Guest, 383 U.S. at 759. 
92  73 U.S. 35 (1867). 
93  Id. at 39. 
94  48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). 
95  Crandall, 73 U.S. at 49. 
96  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
97  Crandall, 73 U.S. at 48. 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/6
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government.98  The Court did not trace the source of this right to 
a particular provision of the Constitution.99  Justice Miller stated 
explicitly that, with one exception,100 the Court’s prior decisions 
in the state taxation cases rested “on no express provision of the 
Constitution . . . [but rather] on the ground that they interfered 
with an authority of the Federal government . . . .”101 
The Court’s 1941 decision in Edwards v. California102 saw 
the Court split into two camps on the issue.  Edwards struck 
down a California ban on transporting indigents into the state 
because it infringed on the right to interstate travel.103  The 
majority opinion, delivered by Justice Byrnes, traced the right 
to travel to the Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the 
power to regulate interstate commerce.104  The majority defined 
“commerce” to include the transportation of persons across state 
lines and held that the California law unduly burdened 
interstate commerce.105  However, Justice Douglas, joined by 
Justices Black and Murphy, wrote a concurring opinion and 
reasoned that the California law in fact violated the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
regardless of whether it intruded upon Congress’ power to 
regulate interstate commerce.106  The crux of Douglas’ reasoning 
was that the freedom to travel between the states had long been 
recognized as a right of national citizenship that the Fourteenth 
Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause protects from 
 
98 Id. at 44. 
99 See id. at 48. 
100 Id.; see also Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827) (citing 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). 
101 Crandall, 73 U.S. at 48. 
102 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
103 Id. at 177. 
104 Id. at 172; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; United States v. Guest, 
383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966). 
105 Edwards, 314 U.S. at 173. 
106 Id. at 177–78 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States . . . .”).  According to Justice Douglas, the majority did not 
give enough weight to a bedrock principle of our constitutional liberty: “[T]he 
the right of persons to move freely from State to State occupies a more 
protected position in our constitutional system than does the movement of 
cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines. . . . [T]he right involved is so 
fundamental that I deem it appropriate to indicate the reach of the 
constitutional question which is present.”  Edwards, 314 U.S. at 177. 
21
2020 BIRTH OF AUTONOMOUS DRIVING 309 
state interference.107 
The constitutional source of our fundamental right to 
interstate travel remains a point of contention in the legal 
community.108  “Although there have been recurring differences 
in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the 
constitutional right of interstate travel, there is no need here to 
canvass those differences further.  All have agreed that the right 
exists.”109  The Supreme Court has made no similar 
pronouncement about the right to intrastate travel, and, in fact, 
“has explicitly decided not to decide whether a constitutional 
right to intrastate travel exists.”110  For the purpose of this 
Comment, it does not matter whether the Constitution 
guarantees a right to intrastate travel; we are guaranteed a 
right to interstate travel, and if that carried with it a 
fundamental right to drive a car, then any ban on human driving 
would be unconstitutional on that basis. 
 
B. Distinguishing the Fundamental Right to Interstate Travel 
from the Privilege of Driving 
 
In a nation where public transit options are limited outside 
major metropolitan areas111 and the number of registered 
 
107 Id. at 178–79. 
108 Matthew Gillespie, Note, Shifting Automotive Landscapes: Privacy 
and the Right to Travel in the Era of Autonomous Motor Vehicles, 50 WASH. U. 
J. L. & POL’Y 147, 149–50 (2016) (“While courts have unanimously agreed that 
a right to travel exists, the consensus surrounding the doctrine seemingly stops 
there.  Courts and commentators dispute not only the basis of the right to 
travel, but also its scope.  This has resulted in an opaque right to travel 
doctrine.” (footnotes omitted)); accord Timothy Baldwin, Note & Comment, The 
Constitutional Right to Travel: Are Some Forms of Transportation More Equal 
than Others?, 1 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 213, 233 (2006). 
109 Guest, 383 U.S. at 759; see also Duane W. Shroeder, Comment, The 
Right to Travel: In Search of a Constitutional Source, 55 NEB. L. REV. 117, 122 
(1975) (“[T]he Court seems to have given up any notion that the right to travel 
can be located in any single part of the Constitution.  Instead, it cites the old 
cases and may add a sentence indicating that the nature of the federal union 
requires a right of interstate travel.  An excellent statement illustrating this 
idea is found in United States v. Guest.” (footnotes omitted)). 
110 Baldwin, supra note 108, at 243 (citing Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa 
County, 415 U.S. 250, 255–56 (1974)); accord, Gillespie, supra note 108, at 
150–51 (“Of these two rights, the Supreme Court has chosen to only rule on 
the [right to interstate travel], leaving divergent rulings on the existence and 
extent of a right to intrastate travel among[] the circuits.” (footnotes omitted)). 
111 See Baldwin, supra note 108, at 218–25. 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/6
310 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 40.2 
passenger vehicles is approaching 200 million,112 one could 
argue that the right to drive a car is a necessary corollary of the 
right to travel113—and the argument is not unprecedented.  In 
Berberian v. Lussier,114 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island 
linked driving with “the right to be free from unreasonable 
interference in the pursuit of a livelihood.”115  The court 
reasoned: 
 
The use of the automobile as a necessary 
adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in modern 
life requires us in the interest of realism to 
conclude that the right to use an automobile on 
the public highways partakes of the nature of a 
liberty within the meaning of the constitutional 
guarantees of which the citizen may not be 
deprived without due process of law.116 
 
The Supreme Court of Idaho echoed those sentiments with 
its decision in Adams v. City of Pocatello117 when it stated that 
“[t]he right to operate a motor vehicle upon the public streets 
and highways is not a mere privilege.  It is a right or liberty, the 
enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the federal 
and state constitutions.”118 
 
112 Number of U.S. Aircraft, Vehicles, Vessels, and Other Conveyances, 
U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. BUREAU TRANSP. STAT., 
https://www.bts.gov/content/number-us-aircraft-vehicles-vessels-and-other-
conveyances (last visited Mar. 27, 2020) (recording 193,672,370 registered 
vehicles in “Light duty vehicle, short wheel base” category, which includes 
passenger cars, light trucks, vans and sport utility vehicles with a wheelbase 
of 121 inches or less, in 2017). 
113 See, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 108, at 154 (“Today, the right to travel 
is, if anything, more critical to the functioning of society. Simple acts such as 
driving one’s own vehicle are often critical to employment, health care, and 
even maintaining family ties.” (footnotes omitted)). 
114 139 A.2d 869 (1958). 
115 Id. at 872. 
116 Id. 
117 416 P.2d 46 (1966). 
118 Id. at 48.  Both courts nonetheless acknowledged that regulating 
driving was a proper exercise of the states’ police powers.  See Lussier, 139 A.2d 
at 872 (“Whatever may be its nature, the right to use the public highways for 
travel by motor vehicles is one which properly can be regulated by the 
legislature in the valid exercise of the police power of the state.”); Adams, 416 
P.2d at 48 (“The right of a citizen to operate a motor vehicle upon the public 
23
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However, the majority of courts to consider that argument 
have rejected it,119 as “American courts generally consider 
restrictions on forms of travel lawful under a state’s discretion 
to exercise its police power.”120  In the 1990s, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit confronted the issue head-on when 
California resident Donald Miller brought an appeal that argued 
the “right to interstate travel encompasses a fundamental right 
to drive a car.”121  The California Department of Motor Vehicles 
had denied Miller’s driver’s license renewal application because 
he refused to provide his social security number.122  By Miller’s 
reasoning, rescission of his license impinged his fundamental 
travel rights because it denied him the right to drive, and driving 
was an essential mode of transportation in modern society.123 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
determination that “by denying Miller a single mode of 
transportation—in a car driven by himself—the DMV did not 
unconstitutionally impede Miller’s right to interstate travel.”124  
 
streets and highways, is subject to reasonable regulation by the state in the 
exercise of its police power.”). 
119 Baldwin, supra note 108, at 216 (“[R]emarkably, American courts do 
not protect an individual’s right to use a motor vehicle.”) (citing Duncan v. 
Cone, No. 00-5705, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33221 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2000) (finding 
there is no fundamental right to drive a car); State v. Cox, 16 A.2d 508, 512 
(N.H. 1940) (finding same), aff’d Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)); 
accord Gillespie, supra note 108, at 152 (“Despite the high deference 
traditionally given to the right to travel generally, courts have consistently 
refused to establish a general right to drive.”). 
120 Baldwin, supra note 108, at 220 (citing Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 
1 (1979) (finding that the states’ police power encompasses reasonable 
restrictions on travel, such as drunk driving laws)). 
121 Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Baldwin, 
supra note 108, at 251–52. 
122 Miller, 176 F.3d at 1205.  Miller claimed the California DMV’s social 
security number requirement conflicted with his religious beliefs: “Miller [did] 
not belong to any organized religion, but ha[d] a long-standing and well-
established personal system of theological belief,” positing that “each 
individual’s actions should be in furtherance of the separate evolving identity 
of each individual during their life.”  Id.  Accordingly, providing a “single 
common identifier” (like a social security number) to different parties for 
different purposes was “tantamount to a ‘sin,’ as that term is commonly used.”  
Id. 
123 Id. at 1205.  The right-to-travel claim was part of a two-pronged 
argument that also alleged violations of Miller’s religious freedom.  See id.  A 
“hybrid” claim that implicated Miller’s religious freedom and another 
fundamental right (here, travel) would subject the California law, as applied 
in Miller’s case, to strict scrutiny.  Id. at 1204. 
124 Id. 
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The court pointed to a group of state and federal cases that 
distinguished the right to travel from the right to a particular 
mode of travel.125  The theory is that, because many reasonably 
accessible means of travel exist, state limitations on (or even 
outright denial of access to) one such means does not seriously 
inhibit one’s ability to travel generally.  The Ninth Circuit 
invoked the Supreme Court of Rhode Island’s decision in 
Berberian v. Petit: 
 
The . . . argument that the right to operate a 
motor vehicle is fundamental because of its 
relation to the fundamental right of interstate 
travel is utterly frivolous.  The plaintiff is not 
being prevented from traveling interstate by 
public transportation, by common carrier, or in a 
motor vehicle driven by someone with a license to 
drive it.  What is at issue here is not his right to 
travel interstate, but his right to operate a motor 
vehicle on the public highways, and we have no 
hesitation in holding that this is not a 
fundamental right.126 
Interestingly, a small New York defense firm posited127 that 
the Supreme Court might abrogate Miller with its decision in 
 
125 Id. at 1205–06 (citing Monarch Travel Servs., Inc. v. Associated 
Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1972) (“A rich man can choose 
to drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk.  The poor man’s lack of 
choice in his mode of travel may be unfortunate, but it is not 
unconstitutional.”)); City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir. 
1982) (“At most, [the air carrier plaintiffs’] argument reduces to the feeble 
claim that passengers have a constitutional right to the most convenient form 
of travel.  That notion, as any experienced traveler can attest, finds no support 
whatsoever in [the Supreme Court’s right of interstate travel jurisprudence] or 
in the airlines’ own schedules.”); Berberian v. Petit, 374 A.2d 791, 794 (R.I. 
1977)). 
126 Petit, 374 A.2d at 794 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).  This 
decision represented a striking about-face for a court that not two decades prior 
had reasoned that driving a car “partakes of the nature of a liberty within the 
meaning of the constitutional guarantees of which the citizen may not be 
deprived without due process of law.”  Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A.2d 869, 872 
(R.I. 1958). 
127 See Brandon Hellwig, Supreme Court Has the Opportunity to Declare 
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Birchfield v. North Dakota.128  The Birchfield case was a 
consolidation of three appeals whose disposition rested on the 
answer to a single question: “whether motorists lawfully 
arrested for drunk driving may be convicted of a crime or 
otherwise penalized for refusing to take a warrantless test 
measuring the alcohol in their bloodstream.”129  The firm 
suggested that the states’ arguments in favor of warrantless 
blood or breath tests for alcohol were “premised on the fact that 
the ability to drive a vehicle is not a right, but a privilege, and is 
therefore not subject to the full protections of the 
Constitution.”130  If the Court saw an opportunity to declare 
driving a fundamental right in Birchfield, it declined the 
invitation: the decision repeatedly refers to the “privilege of 
driving,”131 validating the Ninth Circuit and other courts’ 
conclusion that the fundamental right to interstate travel does 
not create a fundamental right to drive. 
 
IV. The States or the Federal Government Could Eliminate 
Human Driving 
 
A. State Power to Regulate Driving 
 
With respect to state regulation of driving, the Supreme 
Court held in the early-twentieth-century case of Hendrik v. 
Maryland132 that states have broad discretion to regulate 
automobile travel as an exercise of their police powers: 
In the absence of national legislation covering 
the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe 
uniform regulations necessary for public safety 
and order in respect to the operation upon its 
highways of all motor vehicles, those moving in 
interstate commerce as well as others.  And to this 
 
128 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). 
129 Id. at 2172. 
130 Hellwig, supra note 127. 
131 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2169, 2179, 2186.  In each instance, the Court 
uses the phrase “privilege of driving” where it describes the stance of a third 
party (i.e., a state legislature or the United States) on the requirement that 
drivers submit to a BAC test; the Court never challenges the premise that 
driving is a privilege.  See id. 
132 235 U.S. 610 (1915). 
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end it may require the registration of such 
vehicles and the licensing of their drivers, 
charging therefor reasonable fees graduated 
according to the horse-power of the engines, a 
practical measure of size, speed, and difficulty of 
control.  This is but an exercise of the police power 
uniformly recognized as belonging to the states 
and essential to the preservation of the health, 
safety, and comfort of their citizens; and it does 
not constitute a direct and material burden on 
interstate commerce.  The reasonableness of the 
state’s action is always subject to inquiry in so far 
as it affects interstate commerce, and in that 
regard,  it is likewise subordinate to the will of 
Congress.133 
 
Under Hendrick, the states’ regulatory power was subject to 
two conditions: (1) state regulations were subordinate to any 
federal regulations on the same subject; and (2) those 
regulations had to be reasonable to the extent that they affected 
interstate commerce.134  That second reasonableness 
requirement evolved into a balancing test with the Court’s 
decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan,135 
which struck down an Arizona law that limited the number of 
rail cars a passenger or freight train could carry when traveling 
through the state.136  The Court balanced the state’s safety 
interest in minimizing “slack action”137 against the national 
interest in the efficient movement of trains across state lines,138 
 
133 Id. at 622–23. 
134 Id. 
135 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
136 Id. at 763, 783–84. 
137 “Slack action is the amount of free movement of one car before it 
transmits its motion to an adjoining coupled car.  This free movement results 
from the fact that in railroad practice cars are loosely coupled . . . .”  Id. at 776.  
The state’s logic was that the greater number of cars, the greater the slack 
action, and the greater the slack action, the greater the jolting ripple effect of 
movements from car to car, which could injure people at the rear of the train.  
Id. 
138 “[T]he matters for ultimate determination here are the nature and 
extent of the burden which the state regulation of interstate trains, adopted as 
a safety measure, imposes on interstate commerce, and whether the relative 
weights of the state and national interests involved are such as to make 
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and found that while the safety advantage of the law was “slight 
and dubious”139 at best,140 the burden on interstate commerce 
was significant, because trains that exceeded the proscribed 
length had to disassemble at the Arizona border.141 
Throughout its Southern Pacific opinion, the Court cited 
uniformity as the principal factor that determined whether state 
regulations should be subverted in the name of interstate 
commerce.142  In his dissent, Justice Black succinctly 
summarized the reasons for the majority’s emphasis on the need 
for uniformity: “[T]he evil [the Court] finds in a lack of 
uniformity is that it (1) delays interstate commerce, (2) increases 
its cost and (3) impairs its efficiency.”143  That is not to say that 
all state regulations affecting interstate commerce must be 
uniform, but rather, where uniformity of regulation promotes 
efficient commerce, states face a constitutional hurdle imposing 
laws that diverge from the prevailing practice in the rest of the 
nation.144 
In light of Hendrick’s deference to the states’ police power 
and Southern Pacific’s “majority rule” view toward uniformity in 
interstate commerce, it should come as no surprise that most 
state driving regulations would survive constitutional challenge.  
States regulate a wide range of driving conduct, such as speed, 
passing, and use of the car’s seatbelts, headlights, and turn 
signals.  Those regulations vary from state to state, which 
undermines uniformity, but compliance with different driving 
laws requires such incidental adjustments on the part of vehicle 
occupants that they impose little burden on interstate 
 
inapplicable the rule . . . that the free flow of interstate commerce and its 
freedom from local restraints in matters requiring uniformity of regulation are 
interests safeguarded by the commerce clause from state interference.”  Id. at 
770–71. 
139 Id. at 779. 
140 Train accident statistics indicated the Arizona law was actually 
making rail transportation more dangerous; to make up for the reduced 
number of rail cars per train, carriers had to operate more trains, which 
increased the likelihood of collisions.  Id. at 777.  Tellingly, “[t]he accident rate 
in Arizona [was] much higher than on comparable lines elsewhere, where there 
is no regulation of length of trains.”  Id. at 778. 
141 S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 772, 774 (1945). 
142 See id. at 767, 770–71, 773, 776, 779, 781. 
143 Id. at 793 (Black, J., dissenting). 
144 See id. at 774 (“At present the seventy freight car laws are enforced 
only in Arizona and Oklahoma, with a fourteen car passenger car limit in 
Arizona.”). 
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commerce.  To use the aforementioned examples, drivers can 
instantaneously adjust their speed, choose to pass or not to pass 
another vehicle, and exercise similar discretion with respect to 
use of the vehicle’s seatbelts, headlights, and turn signals as 
local law requires.  All of this is possible because federal 
regulations, discussed infra, provide uniformity in the way that 
newly manufactured vehicles are equipped.  While rear 
passengers might not be required to wear seatbelts in State A 
but are required to wear seatbelts in State B, federal law 
guarantees that seatbelts are available for their use when the 
driver crosses state lines,145 and compliance is achieved simply 
by fastening the seatbelt buckle. 
One area where uniform vehicle design does not help drivers 
comply with divergent state driving laws is the minimum 
driving age.  While all states have a graduated licensing system 
that requires young drivers to obtain a learner’s permit or a 
restricted license before they receive full driving privileges, the 
age and experience level at which state residents are eligible for 
those provisional licenses is entirely nonuniform.146  More 
critically, the choice to honor out-of-state provisional licenses 
also varies from state to state.  For example, learner’s permits 
are available to drivers in South Dakota as early as fourteen 
years of age,147 but New York State does not allow anyone under 
the age of sixteen—even if he or she has a valid out-of-state 
learner’s permit or driver’s license—to drive within its 
borders.148  The problem is largely academic, as novice drivers 
are less prone to venture between states with such significant 
disparities in permitting requirements, and drivers engaged in 
commerce of a litigable scale would probably have federally-
regulated commercial driver’s licenses.149  However, some states’ 
 
145 See Occupant Crash Protection, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2016) (requiring 
seatbelt assemblies for all designated seating positions in passenger cars). 
146  Graduated Driver Licensing Information, INS. INST. HIGHWAY SAFETY, 
https://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/laws/graduatedlicenseintro (last visited May 3, 
2020). 
147 See id. 
148 Driving Restrictions on Out-of-State Permits, Junior Licenses, or 
Graduated Licenses, N.Y. ST. DEP’T MOTOR VEHICLES, 
http://nysdmv.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/19/~/driving-restrictions-
on-out-of-state-permits%2C-junior-licenses%2C-or-graduated (last visited 
May 3, 2020). 
149 See generally Commercial Driver’s License Standards; Requirements 
and Penalties, 49 C.F.R. §§ 383.1–383.155. 
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refusal to accept out-of-state driver’s licenses or permits, which 
up to now has gone unchallenged, could take on greater 
precedential value in an era when states begin to outlaw driving 
altogether. 
 
B. Federal Power to Regulate Driving 
 
Generally speaking, while states regulate the driver, the 
federal government regulates the car.150  In 1966, Congress 
enacted the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 
(“NTMVSA”)151 “to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and 
injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents.”152  The 
legislation came in response to a precipitous rise in motor vehicle 
fatalities as an increasing number of Americans took to the 
nation’s highways.153  Before he signed the bill, President 
Johnson declared that “[i]n this century, more than 1,500,000 of 
our fellow citizens have died on our streets and highways; nearly 
three times as many Americans as we have lost in all our 
wars.”154  While its sister legislation, the Highway Safety Act, 
sought to address needed safety improvements to the nation’s 
road infrastructure,155 the NTMVSA authorized the Secretary of 
Transportation to issue motor vehicle safety standards that 
“shall be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and 
be stated in objective terms.”156  Resultant changes to vehicle 
design included the aforementioned seatbelt requirement, 
impact-absorbing steering columns, side-view mirrors, shatter-
 
150 Tina Bellon, U.S. Push for Self-Driving Law Exposes Regulatory 
Divide, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2017 11:25 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-selfdriving-analysis/u-s-push-for-
self-driving-law-exposes-regulatory-divide-idUSKCN1BQ24J. 
151 Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 1, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. 
§§ 30101–30183 (2018)). 
152 49 U.S.C. § 30101.  See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 33 (1983) (discussing the NTMVSA). 
153 See Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Univ. of Cal. Santa Barbara, 
Remarks at the Signing of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 
and the Highway Safety Act, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-signing-the-
national-traffic-and-motor-vehicle-safety-act-and-the-highway (last visited 
May 23, 2020). 
154 Id. 
155 Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564, Title I, § 101, 80 Stat. 
731 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. §§ 402–412 (2018)). 
156 49 U.S.C. § 30111; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 33. 
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resistant windshields, and padded dashboards157—safety 
features we take for granted now that cars can practically drive 
themselves to Starbucks, but ones that car manufacturers had 
not implemented uniformly prior to the NTMVSA.158 
The federal government is able to regulate the design of 
newly manufactured vehicles because they are sold and 
transported through interstate commerce.159  To an extent, the 
federal government’s power to regulate vehicle design confers an 
indirect power to regulate driver conduct.  An illustrative case is 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co., in which the insurance industry 
fought to prevent federal regulators from rescinding one of their 
own safety mandates because they were afraid drivers would not 
wear their seatbelts.160  In the mid-1970s, the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”)161 developed a 
regulation, Modified Standard 208, that required car 
manufacturers to install either airbags or automatic seatbelts in 
new cars for model years 1982 and onward.162  When it issued 
the mandate in 1977, NHTSA believed almost half of 
manufacturers (40%) would opt for airbags; by 1981, it realized 
that automakers instead planned to install automatic seatbelts 
in more than 99% of new cars.163  Citing concerns that (a) the 
lifesaving potential of airbags would not be realized and (b) 
 
157 HENRY PETROSKI, TO FORGIVE DESIGN: UNDERSTANDING FAILURE 253 
(2012). 
158 See id. 
159 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also 49 U.S.C. § 30101(1) (“[I]t is 
necessary to prescribe motor vehicle safety standards for motor vehicles and 
motor vehicle equipment in interstate commerce . . . .”); 49 U.S.C. § 30163(a)(2) 
(“The Attorney General may bring a civil action . . . to enjoin the sale, offer for 
sale, or introduction or delivery for introduction, in interstate commerce . . . of 
a motor vehicle . . . .”). 
160 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 39. 
161 NHTSA is an agency within the Department of Transportation to 
which the Secretary of Transportation delegates rulemaking powers. 
162 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 37.  These so-called “passive 
occupant restraint systems . . . [did] not depend for their effectiveness upon 
any action taken by the occupant except that necessary to operate the vehicle.”  
Id. at 34–35 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Automatic seatbelts were 
symbolic of the way federal regulators tried to exercise police powers by 
hardwiring them into the vehicles.  Despite the Court’s favorable description 
of the automatic belts (“a traditional safety belt, which . . . remains attached 
without impeding entry or exit from the vehicle”), id. at 35, they resulted in 
years of comically graceless exits from vehicles so equipped. 
163 Id. at 38. 
31
2020 BIRTH OF AUTONOMOUS DRIVING 319 
drivers would simply detach the automatic belts instead of 
wearing them, NHTSA rescinded the passive restraint 
requirement altogether.164 
The central issue in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n was 
whether NHTSA’s abandonment of Modified Standard 208 was 
an arbitrary and capricious decision, not the extent of the 
agency’s power to regulate driver conduct through vehicle design 
mandates.165  However, in support of its conclusion that the 
agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously, the Court discussed, 
in exhaustive detail, ways that NHTSA could have modified the 
passive safety requirement to address concerns about seatbelt 
usage that it should have explored before deciding to scrap the 
regulation.166  The opinion does not contemplate legal 
enforcement of seatbelt usage, but rather modifications to the 
mandate that would induce drivers to wear their seatbelts, for 
example, by requiring the automatic belts to be 
nondetachable.167  In this way, the Court endorsed the idea that 
policing driver conduct, in addition to vehicle manufacture, was 
a proper objective of federal safety regulations. 
A more direct means by which Congress can regulate travel 
is requiring states to enact certain legislation as a condition of 
receiving federal funding.168  Congress’ enumerated powers 
include the ability to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and 
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence 
[sic] and general Welfare of the United States.”169  Consistent 
with this power, “Congress may attach conditions on the receipt 
of federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power ‘to 
further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal 
moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory 
and administrative directives.’”170  Congress’ power to impose 
legislative requirements upon the states as a condition of 
receiving federal funds is subject to four limitations.171  First, the 
 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 34. 
166 Id. at 46–57. 
167 Id. at 55–56. 
168 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). 
169 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 206. 
170 Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 
(1980)). 
171 Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990). 
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exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of the general 
welfare.172  Second, “the conditions on receipt of federal funds 
must be reasonably related to the articulated goal.”173  Third, 
Congress must authoritatively and unambiguously state its 
intent to make funds conditional on a particular state action.174  
Fourth, Congress may not use its spending power to force states 
to engage in activity that itself is unconstitutional.175 
Perhaps the most famous modern example of Congress 
using its spending power to commandeer the states’ police power 
is the national speed limit.  Enacted to reduce domestic fossil 
fuel consumption during the Arab Oil Embargo of the early 
1970s, the Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act of 
1974 (“EHECA”)176 required states to impose a maximum speed 
limit of fifty-five miles per hour on all highways as a condition 
of receiving federal highway funds.177  Unlike vehicle safety 
requirements promulgated by NHTSA and imposed upon car 
manufacturers, the EHECA imposed limitations on individual 
drivers (via the states) by making it illegal to drive one’s car 
beyond a set speed on public roads. 
The State of Nevada challenged the national speed limit 
(which was raised to sixty-five miles per hour on some roads in 
1987178) as an unconstitutional imposition of federal spending 
power upon the states.179  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the state did not “seriously rely” on 
any of the four aforementioned spending-power limitations and 
rejected its argument that the speed limit law was not 
reasonably related to the “general welfare” given that Congress 
itself shapes the concept of the general welfare.180  The court 
then considered the State of Nevada’s argument that the 
national speed limit coerced the states into compliance because 
 
172 Id. (citing Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143–44 
(1947); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937)). 
173 Id. (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 207). 
174 Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 
(1981)). 
175 Id. (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 210). 
176 Pub. L. No. 93-239, § 2, 87 Stat. 1046 (1974). 
177 Id. § 2(b)(1), 87 Stat. at 1046; Skinner, 884 F.2d at 446. 
178 Skinner, 884 F.2d at 451. 
179 Id. at 446. 
180 Id. at 447 n.3 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 209). 
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they would otherwise have to forego federal highway funding.181  
The court concluded that the “indistinct coercion limitation” 
recognized in Dole and other cases, which restricts the federal 
government from conditioning receipt of funds “in such a way as 
to leave the state with no practical alternative but to comply 
with federal restrictions,”182 introduced so many variables in its 
application that it was largely untenable.183 
By the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, if Congress could produce 
the same result under a separate enumerated power, it was free 
to do so “through the more gentle commands of the Spending 
Power . . . .”184  The court determined Congress indeed had 
independent authority to impose a national speed limit under 
the Commerce Clause.185  First, Congress had to be able to 
articulate a rational basis for the connection between the 
national speed limit and interstate commerce.  In the court’s 
view, Congress easily met that threshold here: interstate 
highways “and the feeder roads that serv[ed] them” supported a 
large portion of the nation’s commerce, so acts “to secure safe 
and efficient passage over the roads” were well within the 
bounds of congressional authority.186  Second, the national speed 
limit had to be rationally related to achieving the goal of safe, 
efficient passage over the roads.187  Despite Nevada’s objection 
that a lower speed limit would in fact impede interstate 
commerce, the court held Congress was entitled to determine 
how best to facilitate the safe passage of commerce and that the 
lower speed limit was a well-reasoned response to fuel shortage 
concerns created by the Arab Oil Embargo.188 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit disposed of Nevada’s argument 
that the Tenth Amendment circumscribed Congress’ power to 
impose a national speed limit under the Commerce Clause.  
First, the court noted that the “state functions” theory from 
National League of Cities v. Usery,189 which held that Congress 
 
181 Id. at 447–48. 
182 Id. at 448; see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
183 See Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448–49. 
184 Id. at 449. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 450–51. 
187 Id. at 451 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 
241, 262 (1964)). 
188 Id. 
189 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). 
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could not legislate against the states in “areas of traditional 
government functions,” had been overturned.190  Second, the 
court reasoned that, even if Usery were still good law, the 
national speed limit did not “infringe upon any integral state 
function” because control of the highways had long been a joint 
effort between local, state, and federal authorities and was not 
solely the province of state government.191  Finally, the court 
concluded that requiring states to enforce a national speed limit 
did not represent an overbearing use of “state regulatory 
machinery for [the federal government’s] own ends” as 
prohibited by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. 
Mississippi.192  State police already had to enforce speed limits; 
that the limit now resulted indirectly from a federal law had no 
impact on the scope or nature of their duties.193 
Autonomous driving raises unique questions in terms of the 
proper balance between state and federal regulatory 
authority.194  As Reuters’ Tina Bellon points out, self-driving cars 
“[do] not fit neatly into [the] existing regulatory framework” 
where states regulate the driver and the federal government 
regulates the car.195  States began regulating autonomous cars 
as a natural extension of their authority to regulate driving 
generally, but in this new equation, the driver—the living, 
thinking person, whose conduct has always been the subject of 
the state’s police power—is no longer the object of the 
 
190 Skinner, 884 F.2d at 452 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).  By Garcia’s reasoning, “the principal and basic 
limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional 
action—the built-in restraints that our system provides through state 
participation in federal government action.”  468 U.S. at 556.  In other words, 
it was up to Nevada and other states’ congressional representatives to ensure 
that federal regulations of commerce did not unduly burden the states.  Absent 
an “extraordinary defect” in the national political process, the judiciary would 
not intervene.  Skinner, 884 F.2d at 452. 
191 Skinner, 884 F.2d at 452 (citing Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 
25, 38 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
192 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
193 Skinner, 884 F.2d at 453.  The Ninth Circuit doubted FERC’s 
restriction on federal commandeering of state regulatory machinery was still 
valid given Garcia’s presumption that federal law struck the appropriate 
balance of power in the eyes of the states.  Skinner, 884 F.2d at 453.  The court 
included this part of the opinion just in case “pieces” of FERC had survived the 
Garcia decision.  Id. at 453–54. 
194 See Bellon, supra note 150. 
195 Id. 
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regulations.  With self-driving cars, the “driver” may program 
his destination, but in all other senses, he is a passenger who 
relies on the computer at the helm to comply with the laws in 
the jurisdictions through which the car travels.  That computer 
is part of the vehicle’s manufacture, which falls under the 
federal government’s purview. 
Congress, recognizing this emerging power struggle and its 
potential to retard autonomous vehicle development in the 
United States, set out to implement a uniform set of federal 
regulations to govern self-driving cars.196  That proposed 
legislation, called the Safely Ensuring Lives Future Deployment 
and Research in Vehicle Evolution Act (“SELF DRIVE Act”), was 
crafted to prevent states from enacting regulations that would 
pose “an unreasonable restriction on the design, construction, or 
performance of highly automated vehicles.”197  After the SELF 
DRIVE Act passed by unanimous vote in the House of 
Representatives in 2017, its Senate counterpart, the American 
Vision for Safer Transportation Through Advancement of 
Revolutionary Technologies Act (“AV START Act”),198 died in the 
Senate at the end of 2018.199  Congress has since resumed efforts 
to develop autonomous driving legislation.200  If and when the 
first set of federal autonomous driving regulations is enacted, 
the states will be put on notice on how aggressively Congress 
 
196 See id. 
197 Safely Ensuring Lives Future Deployment and Research in Vehicle 
Evolution Act, H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. (2017). 
198 American Vision for Safer Transportation through Advancement of 
Revolutionary Technologies Act, S. 1885, 115th Cong. (2017). 
199 Bellon, supra note 150. 
200 Pete Bigelow, Congress Is Ready to Try Again on AV Legislation, 
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Aug. 10, 2019 12:00 AM), 
https://www.autonews.com/mobility-report/congress-ready-try-again-av-
legislation; see also BILL CANIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45985, ISSUES IN 
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT 1 (2020).  As noted in the 
Congressional Research Service report, for the executive branch’s part, 
[t]he U.S. Department of Transportation and NHTSA have 
issued three reports since 2016 that inform the discussion of 
federal autonomous vehicle policies, suggesting best 
practices that states should consider in driver regulation; a 
set of voluntary, publicly available self-assessments by 
automakers showing how they are building safety into their 
vehicles; and a proposal to modify the current system of 
granting exemptions from federal safety standards. 
Id. para. 3. 
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intends to rebalance the regulatory framework when car and 
driver are one and the same. 
 
V. The Human Driving Ban Is Inevitable 
 
We established that there exists a fundamental right to 
interstate travel; that the fundamental right to interstate travel 
does not protect particular modes of travel; that up to now, 
American courts have not recognized, and have even flat out 
rejected, the notion of a fundamental right to drive; and that 
both state and federal actors may constitutionally regulate the 
act of driving, either directly through limitations on driver 
conduct (e.g., speed limits), or indirectly by imposing uniform 
manufacturing standards that induce driver compliance (e.g., 
automatic seatbelts).  Having laid the groundwork as it relates 
to driving regulations of past and present, we turn to a more 
sobering question about the future: how will it all end? 
 
A. Market Forces as a Catalyst for Autonomous Driving 
 
The transition to autonomous driving will be gradual at 
first, largely independent of any legislative or regulatory action 
by our elected officials.  As with any widely used, mass-market 
commodity, consumer preferences and technological 
development are powerful change agents, and the automotive 
industry is a textbook example.  Over the course of a generation, 
we have watched in-car stereo systems transition from cassette 
decks, to multi-disc CD changers, to A/V input jacks for our 
iPods, to USB ports or completely wireless Bluetooth 
streaming.201  The stick-shift—once considered an economical 
and fuel-efficient alternative to more expensive, slower-shifting 
automatic transmissions—is disappearing from the new car 
market because automatics are more convenient, have become 
 
201 Model Year 2010 marked the demise of the factory-installed cassette 
player.  Stephen Williams, For Car Cassette Decks, Play Time Is Over, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/automobiles/06AUDIO.html.  In 2014, 
83% of new cars sold in the United States had CD players, but by 2021, that 
number will drop to about 50%.  Jay Ramey, Autoweek Asks: Should CD 
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less expensive, and are now more fuel efficient than manuals 
thanks to more complex gearing and faster-shifting 
electronics.202  Aside from enthusiasts, the driving public has no 
reason or desire to learn to drive a stick shift, so it behooves car 
companies to improve manufacturing efficiency and realize 
accompanying cost savings by dropping manuals from 
production altogether.203 
The same will be true of human-driven automobiles.  
Concededly, we remain a way off from set-it-and-forget-it 
autonomous driving.  One of the world’s most advanced semi-
autonomous production vehicles, the Audi A8 luxury sedan, is 
capable of Level 3 autonomy,204 but Audi chose not to equip U.S. 
models with the system due to “an absence of federal legislation, 
fragmented state laws, and disjointed infrastructure 
standards.”205  However, as advanced automated driving 
systems become more commonplace, and Americans become 
more amenable to the idea of having an electronic chauffer, the 
number of human-driven cars on the road will inevitably 
diminish as consumers replace their aging vehicles.206  When it 
 
202 See generally Nathan Bomey, Audi Kills its Manual-Transmission 
Cars: How America Lost its Love for the Stick Shift, USA TODAY (Sept. 7, 2018 
9:52 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2018/09/05/stick-shift-
manual-transmission/1131578002/; Eric C. Evarts, Why Are Manual 
Transmissions Disappearing?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 27, 2016), 
https://cars.usnews.com/cars-trucks/best-cars-blog/2016/09/why-are-manual-
transmissions-disappearing. 
203 As few as 18% of Americans are estimated to know how to drive a 
manual transmission, and only 5% of cars were sold with a stick shift as of 
2016, compared to 25% of cars in 1987 and 30% of trucks in 1990.  Evarts, 
supra note 202. 
204 A Level 3 automated driving system “can itself perform all aspects of 
the driving task under some circumstances.  In those circumstances, the 
human driver must be ready to take back control at any time when the ADS 
requests the human driver to do so.”  Automated Vehicles for Safety, supra note 
31.   
205 Mike Sutton, The 2019 Audi A8 Is a Technological Powerhouse with an 
Asterisk, CAR & DRIVER (Feb. 27, 2019), 
https://www.caranddriver.com/reviews/a26535995/2019-audi-a8-by-the-
numbers/. 
206 The average age of cars in operation in the United States—about 
twelve years old—is at an all-time high.  Wolf Richter, America’s Cars and 
Trucks Are Getting Older, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/americas-cars-and-trucks-are-getting-older-
2018-8.  Auto industry analysts used to view this rising metric optimistically 
as a sign of “pent-up demand” for new cars, but improved reliability means a 
twelve- or fifteen-year-old car in 2020 is not as prime for replacement as it 
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reaches the point that autonomous vehicles significantly 
outnumber human-driven ones, and self-driving technology 
evolves from a pricey options package to something as 
commonplace as today’s rear-view cameras,207 lawmakers and 
regulatory authorities will be more inclined to do away with 
human driving in order to improve safety and eliminate from the 
highways something as anomalous as a horse-drawn carriage in 
2020.  Elon Musk, for one, estimated in 2015 that the transition 
to universal, legally mandated driving autonomy would take 
about twenty years.208 
 
B. Potential Methods of Implementing a Driving Ban 
 
Either the states or the federal government could introduce 
a ban on human driving, or the two might work in tandem.  
Individual state bans on driving would be the approach least 
disruptive to our existing regulatory framework.  As discussed 
in Part IV, states already impose numerous limitations on our 
conduct while within the vehicle, related both to its operation 
and ancillary, distracting activities: we cannot tailgate, we 
cannot hold our mobile devices, and we need to keep at least one 
hand on the wheel.  Now, we would be required to keep both 
hands off the wheel and both feet off the pedals.  Of course, the 
temptation to retake control from the vehicle would be 
significantly reduced if the steering wheel, brake pedal, and 
throttle were eliminated from the car altogether—a 
manufacturing requirement that would fall squarely within the 
purview of federal regulators.  Practical considerations make 
such extreme measures unlikely for the foreseeable future,209 
 
would have been a decade ago.  Id.  Although the used car market continues to 
chip away at would-be new car sales, id., Americans keeping their cars longer, 
combined with the growing availability of self-driving aids in more affordable, 
mass-market vehicles, means that the country may see a wave of a new, 
autonomous cars on the road when the older ones finally get replaced. 
207 The Department of Transportation made rearview cameras mandatory 
for all new cars effective May 1, 2018, due to their potential to prevent 
pedestrian fatalities.  Standard No. 111; Rear Visibility, 49 CFR § 571.111 
S5.5(b) (2014); Nathan Bomey, Backup Cameras Now Required in New Cars in 
the U.S., USA TODAY (May 2, 2018 3:07 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2018/05/02/backup-
cameras/572079002/. 
208 Lowensohn, supra note 2. 
209 Total elimination of a physical means to maneuver the vehicle would 
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but in the end, the physical components that enable human 
driving could be regulated away just as easily as an automatic 
seatbelt or any other part of the automobile. 
If states were the first to ban human driving, proper timing 
and scope would be essential for such laws to survive a 
Commerce Clause challenge.  A state law that banned driving 
prematurely—i.e., out of step with driving practice in other 
states—would disrupt the uniformity that is so essential under 
the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence.210  Just 
like Arizona’s restriction on train lengths, the safety benefits of 
a human driving ban would not outweigh the federal 
government’s interest in the efficient flow of commerce where: 
(a) the majority of U.S. states continued to allow human driving; 
(b) a significant number of people continued to drive; and (c) the 
inability to drive through a particular state impeded the 
transportation of persons across state lines.211  In another 
scenario, if adoption of autonomous driving technology lagged in 
the commercial sector but had become near-universal for 
everyday drivers, a carveout for commercial vehicles would 
likely remedy any Commerce Clause concerns. 
At the federal level, Congress could attempt to unify state 
law by conditioning the states’ receipt of federal highway 
funding on banning human driving.  Such a requirement would 
survive the four-part test articulated in Skinner because it 
would be: (1) in pursuit of the general welfare; (2) reasonably 
related to the articulated goal of eliminating injuries, fatalities, 
and traffic interruptions on the nation’s highways caused by 
human driving; (3) unambiguous in its demand that states 
prohibit driving in order to receive federal funds; and (4) free of 
any requirement that the states act unconstitutionally.212  
Additionally, Congress would have independent authority to 
impose a nationwide driving ban under the Commerce Clause.213  
Legislators, mindful of the potential for Tenth Amendment 
 
demand great faith in the fidelity of the vehicle’s electrical systems.  Further, 
quick, short-distance maneuvers—like moving a car from one end of a dealer 
parking lot to another—might still be more easily performed manually than 
having to program a “destination” a few hundred feet away.  Time will give 
counsel on those points. 
210 See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
211 See id. at 774; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941). 
212 See Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1989). 
213 Id. at 449. 
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lawsuits by the states (however unlikely their success), would 
likely avoid this approach in favor of the funding route.  
However, the fact that Congress could lawfully impose a 
nationwide driving ban would undercut any state claims that 
the funding requirement was coercive; if Congress could impose 
the ban under the Commerce Clause, it could surely do so 
“through the more gentle commands of the Spending 
Power . . . .”214 
 
C. Unlikelihood of a Judicially Recognized, Fundamental Right 
to Drive 
 
An assumption underlying this conjecture is that the 
Supreme Court will not, at some point in the future, recognize 
driving as a fundamental right.  On either a Due Process or 
Equal Protection challenge, the state and federal laws described 
above would be subject to the rational basis test because they do 
not implicate a fundamental right and do not discriminate 
against any suspect or semi-suspect classification.215  While one 
might have a colorable claim that a human driving ban 
discriminates against existing drivers, “drivers” are not a 
suspect or semi-suspect class.  Here, the rational basis would be 
concern for public safety: human error results in injuries and 
fatalities to drivers, passengers, and pedestrians, and by not 
allowing people to drive and instead relying on largely infallible 
computer systems, the public will be safer.  In addition, the 
predominance of autonomous vehicles that could coordinate and 
anticipate each other’s movements would make rogue, human-
driven vehicles further hazardous to the “driving” public.  Public 
safety interests are a broadly accepted basis for the exercise of a 
 
214 Id. at 448–49. 
215 “Where a statute neither interferes with a fundamental right nor 
singles out a suspect classification, substantive due process demands no more 
than a reasonable fit between a governmental purpose and the means chosen 
to advance that purpose. . . . In fact, the rational basis test is identical under 
the two rubrics of equal protection and due process.”  16B AM. JUR. 2D 
Constitutional Law § 965 (2019) (footnotes omitted).  Suspect classifications 
are those based upon “race or national origin, religion, alienage, 
nonresidency . . . and wealth.”  Id. § 866.  Semi-suspect classifications are those 
based upon gender or illegitimacy.  Id. § 867. 
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state’s police powers216 and congressional action.217 
Drivers, realizing their driving privileges are in jeopardy, 
might urge federal courts to recognize for the first time that 
driving is a fundamental right.  However, the Supreme Court 
 
has always been reluctant to expand the concept 
of substantive due process [i.e., fundamental 
rights] because guideposts for responsible 
decision[-]making in this unchartered area are 
scarce and open-ended.  The doctrine of judicial 
self-restraint requires [the Court] to exercise the 
utmost care whenever [it is] asked to break new 
ground in this field.218 
 
The Court’s recognition of a fundamental right or liberty 
requires first that the right be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they 
were sacrificed.”219  Second, the claimant must provide a “careful 
description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”220 
The first requirement invites zealous advocacy for the 
fundamental right to drive.  What could be more American, more 
deeply embedded in the psyche of this nation’s people, than the 
freedom of the open road?  James Hartzell’s legendary 1974 ad 
campaign, “Baseball, Hot Dogs, Apple Pie, and Chevrolet,”221 
 
216 E.g., Sylvia Landfield Trust v. City of L.A., 729 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (“Governmental action is rationally related to a legitimate goal 
unless the action is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
217 See, e.g., Skinner, 884 F.2d at 450–51. 
218 Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1988) (internal 
citation omitted).  The predominant concern is that “the liberty protected by 
the Due Process Clause [would] be subtly transformed into the policy 
preferences of the Members of [the] Court.”  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
219 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
220 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
221 Kiran Aditham, Creator of ‘Best Automobile Commercial Ever Made’ 
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succinctly summarizes how “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition” driving has become, if only for the last 
century of America’s near-250-year existence.  But the second 
requirement—a clear definition of the right asserted—starts to 
erode the entire argument.  The Court only needs to define 
fundamental rights when those rights are threatened by 
government action.  Here, that action is a ban on human driving.  
What, exactly, is “human driving”?  Turning the steering wheel, 
pressing the throttle, and applying the brakes—the physical 
actions required to control a car.  Whatever enjoyment we might 
derive from the act of driving a car, that physical element is not 
important to the liberty interest at stake in a world where 
autonomous cars are a reality.  We will still have the freedom to 
go anywhere we want in our cars; we simply will not be 
physically responsible for piloting them to our destination.  If 
driving is a fundamental right, the power to choose one’s 
destination and the sense of personal autonomy inherent in that 
power are what make it fundamental—not the trivialities of 
pushing the pedals and turning the steering wheel. 
Thus, we are left with two possible alternatives and one 
practical result.  The first alternative is that the Supreme Court 
will never recognize driving, whether performed by a human 
being or a computer system, as a fundamental right, consistent 
with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Miller and other courts that 
have spoken to the issue.  The second alternative is that the 
Court will recognize “driving,” i.e., the operation of a vehicle, as 
a fundamental right because so many Americans depend upon 
driving to exercise other protected freedoms, including the right 
to interstate travel.  However, that right will still not prevent 
states or the federal government from imposing a ban on the 
physical act of driving when autonomous vehicles serve the same 
end—and in a much more equitable fashion.  The disabled, the 
blind, and the elderly are just three demographics who may 
currently be denied the privilege of driving due to the physical 
capabilities it requires, and who would realize freedom in an 
entirely new dimension if the car could do the driving for them.  
Indeed, when one considers the implications that autonomous 
cars have for driving (it will be reduced to little more than 
sitting), it seems all the more unlikely that the Supreme Court 
will ever recognize a fundamental right to “drive” as we 
understand that term today.  Driving will no longer demand 
43
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Other constitutional questions remain.  Could a driving ban 
be construed as a government taking, rendering worthless 
whatever remains of the more than 270 million registered 
vehicles on the road today222 that cannot drive themselves?  
Trying to answer (or even anticipate) all the questions that 
autonomous driving will present at this nascent stage in its 
development invites the kind of conjecture that, decades from 
now, will seem like a futile exercise—much like Francis 
Houdina’s radio-controlled stunt on the streets of New York City 
in 1925.  It is rather sobering to think that the millions of 
Americans who still know the love of driving will live to see that 
passion consigned to a racetrack.  However, transportation 
expert Samuel Schwartz offers an important reminder in his 
proposal for how American society should navigate the advent of 
autonomous driving: “We have to put people first.  Out of 
everything I have learned working in the ‘traffic business,’ that 
is the most crucial lesson.”223  When the day comes that driving 
is more harmful to the general welfare than it is beneficial, it 
will be wholly consistent with our nation’s understanding of good 
government to relegate driving to the annals of history.  The 
future is a world without drivers, and the U.S. Constitution will 
not stand in the way. 
 
 
222 Number of U.S. Aircraft, Vehicles, Vessels, and Other Conveyances, 
supra note 112 (recording 272,480,899 total registered highway vehicles in 
2017). 
223 SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 197. 
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